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ABSTRACT
This paper uses sales and patent distribution data to establish
the market and technological "positions" of firms. A notion of tech-
nological proximity of firms is developed in order to quantify poten-
tial R&D spillovers. The importance of the position variables and the
potential spill—over pool in explaining R&D intensity, patent produc-
tivity and TFP growth is explored.
I find that both technological and market positions are signifi-
cant in explaining R&D intensity, and that the technological effects
are significant in explaining patent productivity. I cannot distin-
guish between the two effects in explaining TFP growth. Spillovers
are important in all three contexts. Firms in an area where there is
a high level of research by other firms do more R&D themselves, they
produce more patents per R&D dollar, and their productivity grows
faster, even controlling for the increased R&D and patents. These
effects are present controlling for both industry and technological
position effects.
Adam B. Jaffe
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Ma 02138
(6ii) 868—3900I .Introduct ion1
This paper uses company cross—section data to investigate two
interrelated questions regarding the determinants of industrial R&D
activity and productivity growth. The questions are:(1) what is the
relative importance of market conditions and exogenous technological
conditions in determining the allocation of resources to research, and
in explaining the growth of productivity; and (2) are there observable
"spillover effects" among firms' research programs.
There is a long history of debate in economics on whether innova-
tionis more often the result of the "pull" of market forces or of the
"push" of exogenous technological factors. Schmookler (1966) argued
that, looking across industries over time, theeffect of expected
marketsize on the expected returnwas the primary determinant ofthe
allocationof resources to invention.2 Rosenberg (1971t and 1983),
while not denying the importance of the factors cited by Schmookler,
argues that factors on the cost or supply side of invention are also
of major importance in explaining both the allocation of resources to
invention and the resulting growth of productivity. These supply—side
factors include variations in both the intrinsic difficulty of innova-
tion in different technical areas and also variations in the state of
generalknowledge in different areas. Both of these factors are often
summed up in the phrase "technological opportunity." Scherer (1965 and
1.I am indebtedto Profs. Zvi Griliches and Richard Caves for their
ongoingadvice and counsel, and to Prof. Mark Schankerman, Jim
Hines, Sumanth Addanki and John Bound for helpful suggestions.
Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation
through grant PRA8I—08635 and by the Sloan Foundation.
2. Myers and Marquis (1969) found that most successful innovations
were perceived by the firms involved as having been market driven.
This and other related studies are critiqued in Rosenberg (1983).—2—
especially 1982a) finds that dummies for broad technological classes
explain much of the variance in innovative intensity across industries
and argues that this is evidence for the importance of technological
opportunity. In this paper, I use independently derived data on
firms' "market positions" and "technological positions" to distinguish
demand—pull and technological opportunity effects.
The theoretical possibility and potential importance of R&D
spillovers are more recent concerns in the literature. They have been
discussed by Griliches (19T9), Reinganum (1981), and Spence (l98).
Griliches points out that the extent of spillovers is crucial to
assessing the contribution of R&D to productivity growth, and Spence
emphasizes that in R&D—intensive industries the extent of spillovers
is an element of market structure with important implications for
conduct and performance. Despite this recognition of the importance
of spillovers, there is little empirical evidence on their actual
significance.
Like technological opportunity, spillovers affect the cost of
innovation. If appropriability is imperfect, then having lots of
other firms doing research in the same areas as you may reduce the
cost of innovating for you. This positive externality should be
observable as a correlation between, on the one hand, the firm's inno-
vative output and productivity growth, and, on the other hand, the
3 .Theterm "spillovers" is used by different writers to describe
slightly different phenomena. I use it to describe a transfer of
knowledge from one firm to another unmediated by any market tran-
saction. I thereby exclude the phenomenon whereby improved pro-
ducts are sold at prices that do not fully reflect their higher
quality, thereby "spilling" research benefits from suppliers to
customers. See Scherer (1982b) and Griliches and Lichtenberg(198a).—3—
intensity of research in its "neighborhood" (to be made precise
below). This correlation should remain even after controlling for the
firm's own R&D.
This positive externality is technological: it derives from the
inherent public good aspect of knowledge. There are also reasons to
expect negative externalities among research programs, generated by
competition. Because of patent laws, other firms' research may reduce
your innovative output, particularly if innovative output is measured
by patents. Similarly, most firms face downward sloping demand cur-
ves, which shift inward when a competitor lowers price or improves
quality. This generates a negative effect of other's research on the
firm's productivity, if productivity is measured in terms of revenues.
Empirically, it would be difficult to distinguish separately the posi-
tive and negative effects. In this paper I simply estimate partial
correlations that capture the net effect of the two.
It should be emphasized that this paper examines the effect of
variations in spillovers, not variations in the conditions of
appropriability. The distinction can be clarified by reference to the
model of Spence(198l). Assume that for every dollar a firm spends on
R&D, a fraction U "spills over" and is freely available to any firm.
The appropriability environment is then parameterized by 0. Low 0
represents easy appropriation; 0 approaching unity represents R&D as a
pure public good. Increasing 0 (reducing the extent of appropriation)
has two effects: the private rate of return to R&D falls because of—'i—
theinability to capture the returns, but the industry—wide produc-
tivity of R&D rises because of the fuller exploitation of the public
good nature of knowledge.
Spence's firms are identical, so they all enjoy spillovers to the
same extent; in this framework, Spence examines the effect of changing
0. In this paper, I assume, in effect, that 0 is the same for all
firms, but that firms differ in their R&D intensity and their tech-
nological areas of interest. I examine the effect of the variations in
the "pooi" of spilled research available to different firms, these
variations being generated by variations in the intensity of other
firms' research in the relevant technological areas.
To measure this pooi of relevant spilled research (and to test for
technological opportunity effects), we need a framework for charac-
terizing and differentiating the research interests of firms. The
next section of the paper establishes such a framework. The following
three sections present empirical results for R&D intensity, patent
production and productivity growth. Concluding observations follow.
II. Technology Space, Market Space, and Technological Proximity
The typical large manufacturing firm is somewhat diversified both
in terms of the products it sells and the research it pursues. These
two patterns of diversification are not unrelated, but they are
distinct. Even the seller of a single product like an automobile will
typically do research in diverse areas, such as aerodynamics, engines,—5—
and structural properties of materials. For the purpose of this
paper, I do not try to understand these patterns of diversification,
or their mutual relationship. I seek only to characterize the firm's
research interests and market position in a way that takes them into account.
To do this, I construct two conceptually analagous distribution
vectors for each firm. Firm i's technological position vector
indicates the fraction of the firm's research effort
devoted to the K diverse technological areas. It's market position
vector gj=(gi...gj) indicates the fraction of its sales that go to
the L distinct markets.
For concreteness, we can visualize these vectors as locating the
firm in a K—dimensional technology space and an L—dimensional market
space. The question of the importance of technological opportunity
then becomes: Does position in technology space matter in explaining
patterns in the allocation of resources to research and in produc-
tivity growth? The inportance of demand—side effects can be explored
by asking the same question for position in market space.
In this framework, the existence of R&D spillovers implies
that a firm's performance is affected by the research activity of its
neighbors in technology space. To make this notion operational
requires significant additional structure. I assume that the total
relevant activity of other firms can be summarized by a "potential
spillover pool" that is simply a weighted sum of other firms' R&D,
It. The characterization of technological areas and markets used to
make this approach operational are discussed below.—6—
with weights proportional to the proximity of the firms in technology
space. To measure the proximity of firms I and j, I use the angular




Thus, in constructing the pooi for firm i, firms whose position vector
is Identical to f1 get a weight of unity; firms whose vector is ortho-
gonal get zero weight, and others get an intermediate weight that
depends on the degree of overlap of the two firms' research interests.7
In this formulation, firms with rather diverse research interests
potentially benefit to a small extent from the research of virtually
all other firms. (That is, there may be no j for which Pjj is zero.)
This may seem implausible. An alternative view is that firms are
aware of the activities of a fairly small number of technologically
similar firms; developments by others, even though potentially rele-
vant, are simply not likely to be noticed. To explore this possibi—
lit1, the firms were clustered into groups based on their techno-
logical positions, and the total pooi described above was partitioned
into the part coming from other members of the same cluster, and the
part coming from outside the cluster. In the empirical work below,
the differential effects of these two parts is explored.
Before going on to describe the empirical results, I pause to
discuss the data used to construct the position vectors and the
spillover pooi. The technological position is based on the distribu—
5. Bernstein and Nadiri (1983) measure spillovers using a cost func-
tion approach and time series data for the chemical industry. Their
pooi variable is the unweighted sum of the R&D of all other firms in
the industry.—7—
tion of the firm's patents over the 328 technology classes used by the
U.S. Patent Office. This information is available for the patents
granted between 1969 and 1981 to about 1700 manufacturing firms in the
R&D panel that has been assembled recently at the NBER. This dataset
is a marriage of Compustat and Patent Office data that is documented
in Cummins, et al (l98) and Bound, et al (l98t). The companies in
the dataset were granted about 260,000 patents. over the period. The
average firm has one or more patents in about 20 of the 328 classes.
The classes themselves vary greatly in importance, from "Chemistry,
carbon compounds" with 20,000 patents taken by 34O different firms to
"Bee culture" which has one patent. (There are eight classes in which
these firms took no patents, including "Land vehicles, animal draft"
and "Whips and whip apparatus.") To make the distribution vectors
empirically usable, the 328 classes were grouped into 149 categories.
This grouping was essentially ad hoc, based on the names, with more
aggregation of classe,s with few patents, and less aggregation of those
that had many.
For this paper, a subsample of 573firmswas selected. These
firms all reported R&D in 1976, received at least 10 patents over the
period, and are also available on the Harvard Business School PICA
database. The first two requirements bias the sample toward tech-
nology intensive firms, and the latter toward large firms. The firms
had average 1976 sales of $1.14 billion, they average 29.5patentsper
year, and they reported average R&D of $25.1 million in 1976. TheTABLE 1
PATENTCATEGORIES WITH 'IOTALSFOR CLUSTERING SAMPLE, 1965—72
CATEGORY NUMBER OF NUMBER OF COMPANIES
PATENTS WITH ANY HAVING THIS AS
PATENTS PRIMARY CATEGORY
ACOUSTICS 142)4 86 2
ADHESIVES AND COATINGS 5093 3140 21
AERONAUTICS 1417 6i 3
AMMUNITION &EXPLOSIVES 8142 93 4
APPAREL 645 130 4
BOATS, SHIPS & AQUATIC DEV. 269 67' 1
CHEMISTRY,ANAL. & PHYS. 1404 209 14
CHEMISTRY, CARBON 10408 220 45
CHEMISTRY, ELECTROCHEMISTRY 5779 2145 10
CHEMISTRY,HYDROCARBONS 2666 110 6
CHEMISTRY, INORGANIC 2149 1140 3
CHEMISTRY, ORGANIC 5900 1146 15
CLEANING AND ABRADING 1252 216 11
COMBUSTION 1056 i4 14
COMPOSITIONS 3679 208 II
CUTTING 991 212 11
DRUGS 2442 132 6
ELEC COMPUTERS & DATA PROC. 41466 198 12
ELEC TRANSMISSION & SYSTEMS 7609 291 31
ELEC MOTORS & GENERATORS 2706 205 6
ELEC COMMUNICATION 5629 230 20
FARMING 229 71 0
FLUID HANDLING 6866 396 45
FOOD 1734 152 28
MACHINE ELEMENTS 2447 238 3
MEASURING,TESTING & SIGNALING 3987 323 i6
MEDICAL 1724 196 10
METALS & METALWORKING 5703 334 28
MISC ARTICLE HANDLING 5760 387 32
MISCARTICLES 2998 249 9
MISCCONSUMER GOODS 14lO 1914 16
MISC ELECTRONIC DEVICES 21458 128 1
MISC HARDWARE 1376 230 7
MISC MACHINERY 855 134 7
NUCLEAR 213 21 0
OPTICS 31)414 179 7
PAPERMAN & FIBERPROC. 571 125 8
PIPES & JOINTS 1214 226 2
POWER PLANTS (NON—ELECTRIC) 4145 311 20
PRINTING & TYPEWRITING 95)4 139 6
RADIANT ENERGY 5254 2144 13TABLE 1 (Continued)
PATENT CATEGORIES WITH TOTALS FOR CLUSTERING SAMPLE, 1965—72
CATEGORY NUMBER OF NUMBER OFCOMPANIES
PATENTS WITHANY HAVING THIS AS
PATENTS PRIMARY CATEGORY
RECEPTACLES & PACKAGES 2190 286 17
REFRIDGERATION& HEAT EXCH. 3260 261 15
SERVICES 197 61 1
STATICSTRUCTURES 1282 269 13
SYNTHETIC RESINS 4382 152 6
TEXTILE MAN & TREATMENU 1699 l46 7
VEHICLES 291L8 198 13
WELLS & EARTH WORKING 2230 129 7—8—
technological position is based on all patents applied for by 1972.6
Table One lists the 19patentcategories with some statistics for the
sample used in this paper.
The nErket position vectors were constructed using the firm's
distribution of shipments over 4digit nnufacturing SIC's in 1972.
These data were taken from the PICA database at Harvard Business
School, described in Shesko (1982).They are based on the assignment
of the firms' establishments to SIC's, and the aggregation of
establishment shipments. I aggregated these 1450 SIC's up to the 19
industry groups used in Bound, et al, which were designed to
correspond to the product field categories used by the NSF in its R&D
surveys. Table 2 shows these industries with some statistics; the
definition of the industries by constituent SIC's is given in Appendix A.
To give some idea of what these vectors look like, Figure One
shows the distribution of the Herfindahi indices (the sums of the
squared fractions) of the patent category and industry shares for each
firm. It shows that, in this data, firms are far more diversified in
technology space than in market space. The median patent class
Herfindahl is about .18, while for the industry fraction vectors it is
about .68. This is not due primarily to the larger number of patent
categories; calculating the industry Herfindahi at the 3—digit level
6. Note that only patents that were ultimately granted are included in
the database.TABLE 2
STATISTICSFOR INDUSTRY GROUPS




FOOD& KINDRED PRODUCTS 70.2 92 I6
TEXTILES & APPAREL 11.8 78 19
CHEM EXC. DRUGS 89.2 191 57
DRUGS & MED INSTRS. 23.5 66 28
PETROLEUM REF. & EX. 11t7.7 2 15
RUBBER&MISC PLASTICS 19.1 160 rr
STONE,CLAY & GLASS 15.1 112 23
PRIMARY METALS 42.O 163
FABRIC. METAL PRODUCTS 30.5 215 37
ENGS, FARM & CONST. EQ. 28.5 112 23
OFFICE, COMP., & ACCTG 21.1 51 15
0TH MACH, NOT ELEC 25.0 263 )49
ELECEQ. & SUPPLIES 33.1 172 29
COMMUNICATION EQ. 30.0 1I2 3l
MOTORVEH & TRANS EQ 92.7 90 26
AIRCRAFT& AEROSPACE 32.7 81L 19
PROF.& SCI EQ. 23.6 151t 29
LUMBER,WOOD & PAPER 35.1 181 36




































































































































































































































































































































































































(139 industries) decreases it only to .31. I believe the difference
is partly real, due to the tendency for even narrow product lines to
incorporate several technologies. It is also partly an artifact of the
data. Patents are a much less lumpy observation than establishments,
so it is much easier to have a smattering of patents in many cate-
gories than it is to have a smattering of establishments in many
industries.
Turning to the pool variable, this is constructed using the tech-
nological position vectors and some measure of the R&D of each firm.
As discussed below, for some purposes we want the pooi of R&D annual
flows, and for some we want the pooi of accumulated R&D stocks. If,
for example, rj is the 1976 R&D expenditure of firm j, then the 1976
R&D potential spillover pooi for firm i is:
s P r (2)
j
where Pjj is the technological proximity of i and j as defined in (i).7
Note that Spence's 8 has been omitted from Eq. (2). As long as 0 is
constant across firms, this means only that the units of the pooi
variable are arbitrary. Since I will be estimating elasticities, this
is of no concern. To the extent, however, that 0 varies across firms,
the pooi variable is not measured correctly.
A within—cluster spillover pool is calculated in the same manner,
7. In empirical work below, the variables ii••iK and s will be
used as regressors in the same equation. Therefore, it may be use-
ful to note the relation between s and the f's in matrix terms. Define
F as the 573x49 matrix whose rows are the f1Ts. Let FN be the
matrix derived from F by normalizing each row so its sum of squares
is unity. Then the column vector s is given by s =(FNFN—I)r
where r is the vector of firms' R&D spending.—10—
but with the summation running only over firms in the same cluster.
The procedure for clustering the firms into technological groups is
described in Appendix B. Basically, I assume that the distribution of
each firm's patents over classes is generated by a stable im.iltinomial
distribution; I group firms so that the likelihood is high that the
patents of firms in the same group could have come from the same
underlying irultinomial distribution. This approach yields an itera-
tive clustering algorithm that simultaneously estimates the underlying
multinomial distributions for each group and assigns firms to groups.
The resulting groups are shown with some relevant statistics in Table
Three. Table Four presents a cross—tabulation of firms by these
groups and industries. For this purpose, the PICA industry distribu-
tion data was ignored, and the firms were assigned to industries on
the basis of their Compustat primary SIC.
For these pools to be reasonable measures of the potential R&D
spillovers, it must be the case that the firms in the sample account
for most of the relevant R&D. The amount of R&D done by out of sample
firms is, of course, difficult to quantify, but two relevant com-
parisons can be made. First, the sample firms did 9)4% of the R&D
reported by all Compustat manufacturing companies in 1976. Second,
the current sample reported R&D equal to 86%ofthat reported to NSF
in its annual survey in manufacturing product areas. Table Five
presents a comparison by the 19 industry groups of the R&D of the
sample firms and the R&D reported to the NSF in the corresponding

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COMPARISON OF R&D TOTALS F)R SAMPLE FIRMS AND NSF SURVEY
INDUSTRY NSF* 573firm
TotalFederal Company Sample
FOOD&KINDRED PRODUCTS 329 — - 562
TEXTILES&APPAREL 82 — - 92
CHEM EXC. DRUGS 1926 — — l7l1
DRUGS& MEDINSTRS. 1091 — — 969
PETROLEUMREF. & EX. 767 52 715 6io
RUBBER& MISC PLASTICS 502 — — 313
STONESCLAY & GLASS 263 — — 231
PRIMARY METALS 506 26 18i
FABRIC. METAL PRODUCTS 358 36 322 I76
ENGINESANDMACH NEC 1085 23 1062 1100
OFFICE, COMP., & ACCTG 21402 509 1893 1303
ELEC EQ. & SUPPLIES 3125 11462 1663 760
COMMUNICATION EQ. 2511 1093 11418 895
MOTORVEH& TRANS EQ 2778 383 2395 2251
AIRCRAFT & AEROSPACE 6339 14930 11409 983
PROF.& Sd EQ. 1298 155 1114.14 1069
LUMBER,WOOD & PAPER 1420 — — 14.71
ALLOTHER 217 5 212 2149
TOTAL 26,093918616,906 114,513
NSF(1979)—11—
industries in proportion to its (1972) sales. This, of course, under—
allocates to R&D—intensive industries, and to those that grew faster
than average 1972—76. The former is visible in the Table in the fact
that Food and Textiles both show more R&D by these firms than was
reported to NSF; the growth problem may partially explain the computer
shortfall. Even allowing for these tendencies, there appears to be
significant under—representation in the current sample in Computers,
Electrical Equipment, Communications and Aircraft and Aerospace. This
introduces a potential bias of unknown importance into the subsequent
analysis.
III. Research Intensity
We test for technological position, industry and spillover effects
in 3 areas: the distribution of R&D effort itself, the production of
new knowledge, and the growth of total factor productivity. For R&D
intensity, we estimate an equation which is an extension of that used
in Bound, et al (1981):
iog(r.)1log(.) +2log(C.)+3M.+log(sT)+
+ kik+ ag+ c.
where r1 is the annual R&D of the 1th firm qi is its sales, C is its
capital stock, Mi is its sales—weighted average market share, and s1
is the pool of spilled research potentially available to it.8 The
8. Throughout this paper, the subscript k will refer to the tech-
nological areas and the subscript 2 will refer to industries.
Capital letters represent stocks, and lower case letters the
related flows.—12—
superscripts T and C refer, respectively, to the total and within—
cluster poois. The ik and g1 are the patent class and industry
fractions defined above. All the ej's in this paper are stochastic
errors assumed independently but not necessarily identically distributed.
This equation is not an R&D demand equation derived from optimal
firm behavior; it is simply a device to examine patterns of R&D
intensity descriptively. It is ntivated by heuristic arguments about
things that affect the cost and benefits of R&D. Since R&D is like a
fixed cost, greater sales imply a greater return to R&D, at least to
the extent that the external market for innovations is imperfect and
innovation itself cannot be expected to increase sales dramatically.
I include physical capital to allow for input complementarity, and for
comparability with Bound, et al.
The firm's average market share is included on the notion that, in
an environment of imperfect appropriability, the knowledge that your
research nay help your competitors is a disincentive to your doing
R&D. Firms with large market shares may be less worried about this,
and hence choose a higher R&D intensity.
The spillover pooi affects R&D by increasing its productivity;
this should cause the optimizing firm to choose a higher R&D intensity
where the pooi is greater.9 The inclusion of the log of the total
pool and the fraction that is within—cluster is an approximation to a
9. A more satisfactory story about the market share and pool effects
requires explicit modelling of the firms' competitive interaction
in the presence of spillovers. This will be a focus of future work.—13—
specification where the "effective pool" is given by:
s=(l+6)s+s9=6s+s=s{l+6(s?/s)] (Ii)
where the superscript 0 refers to the out—of—cluster pool; 6 is then
the premium associated with the within—cluster portion. If 6(sd/sT)
is small, then log(sE)log(sT) +6(5C/5T)•For this sample, 5C75T has
a mean of .15; S turns out to be less than 1.
Ifvariations in technological opportunity are a major factor in
determining the cost of R&D, then we would expect the technological
positioneffects in Eq. (3) to be important; that is, we should reject
the hypothesis that the Ik's are all equal. Similarly, if variations
in demand are important determinants of the returns, this should be
reflected in the industry effects (the cL.'s).
To estimate equation (3), a cross—section of firms for 1976 was
chosen, 1976 being the year in which R&D was reported for the greatest
number of firms. The definition of the R&D, sales, physical capital
and market share variables is described in Appendix A. The pool
variables are constructed using the weighted sum of other firms'
reported 1976 R&D. In order to use the same sample in this and the
next section, firms with no patents 1975—77 were dropped (though their
R&D is still in the pool), leaving 537 firms.
The first column of Table 6 tests for market share and spillover
effects without allowing industry or technological position effects.
Both effects are positive and significant quantitatively and statisti-
cally. The cluster premium 6 is also positive and significant. These
effects remain, though the pool effect is diminished, when we addTABLE 6
RESULTS OF R&D INTENSITY EQUATION ESTIMATION
(1976 Cross—Section)
Dependent Variable: Log of R&D
I
Log(Sales) .980 .900 .9143 .877 .931
(.091) (.102) (.095) (.095)(.o14i)
Log(Net Plant) —.156 .083 —.087 .052
(.076) (.090) (.082) (.0814)
Market Share 2.63 2.13 2.80 2.51 2.57
(.715) (.5147) (.563) (.5146)(.525)
Log (Total Pool) .7149 .292 .391 .267 .276
(.o86) (.097) (.071) (.080) (.077)
Cluster Pool/Total Pool 1.08 .560 .066 —.062
(.255) (.221) (.3214) (.312)
F—statistic on Overall 53.3 8.5 4.5 2.14
Pool Effect (2,531) (2,513) (2,1483) (2,1465)
F—statistic on Industry 16.8 5.14
Effects (18,513) (18,1465)
F—statistic on Technological 5.8 2.0
Area Effects (148,1483) (148,1465)
R2 .719 .823 .822 .853 .853
& .901 .728 .752 .697 .696
Notes: 537 observations. Numbers in parentheses under coef-
ficients are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
calculated according to White (1980); F—statistics are not
corrected for heteroskedasticity.
F critical values: .95 .99
(2,1400) 3.0
(20,1400) 1.6 1.9
(50,1400) 1.14 1.6industry- effects in Column 2; in addition, the industry effects are
highly significant. Column 3 gives the results controlling for tech-
nological position effects but not industry effects. Again the pooi
variable is significant, but the cluster premium now goes to zero.
The technological area effects are also significant themselves.
Column 14allowsfor all effects. The pool coefficient is signifi-
cant, with no evidence of a premium for the within—cluster portion.1°
The elasticity of own R&D with respect to the weighted sum of all
others is between .2 and .3. It should be emphasized that the absence
of a premium for the within—cluster firms says only that after
weighting by proximity, there is no further differential to the in—
cluster firms (who are proximate by construction).
These results imply a significant effect of the spillover pool
at a given location in technology space, over and above the ttpurefl
positional effect that is interpreted in terms of technological
opportunity. There is no way of knowing, however, that the pattern of
technological opportunity can be captured completely by a linear rela-
tionship with the position variables as specified here. Since the
pooi variable depends (non—linearly-) on position, it could be picking
up residual higher—order technological opportunity effects. If we
were to allow for an arbitrarily complicated pattern of technological
opportunity, we could not distinguish a separate effect of spillovers,
even in principle, since any reasonable definition of the spillover
10. It should seem peculiar that the t—statistic for the pool coef-
ficient is so much more significant than the F—statistic for both
pool—related coefficients. This is due to the fact that the white
correction, in this case, reduces the estimated si.andard error; the
F—statistics have not been corrected.—15—
pool imist depend on technological position. Restricting technological
opportunity effects to being linear in technological position should,
therefore, be viewed as an untestable identifying restriction.
The market and technological position effects are also both
significant, as theory would predict. Note that the difference in
significance between the two is nostly due to degrees of freedom; the
fraction of the variance explained by the market effects is only
slightly larger. (See Table Ten and related discussion below.)
IV. Knowledge Production
The next area in which the effects of spillovers should be detec-
table is in the innovative output of the firm. We postulate a pro-




where k is the new knowledge produced by the firm and the other
variables are as above.1-1- In practice, we use patents as an indicator
for k.-2 Note that this formulation implies that spillovers increase
the productivity of own R&D; below I allow them also to influence
11. Actually, we expect knowledge production to depend on a distributed
lag of R&D, but this lag structure is difficult to identify, and
much of the weight appears to fall on the contemporaneous R&D. See
Fakes and Griliches (198)4) and Hall, Griliches and Hausinan (1983).
12. There has been a long debate on the general question of the use-
fulness of patent data as an indicator of inventive output. For pre-
sent purposes, suffice it to say that patents have repeatedly
passed tests of their economic relevance. See Schmookler (1966),
Fakes and Griliches (198)4), Bound, et al (198)4), Fakes (198)4), and
Hirschey (1982).TABLE 7
RESULTS OF }OWLEDGEPRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION
(1976Cross—Section)
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Patents Applied for, 1975—1977
I
Log(R&D) .71L8 .759 .713 .722
(.027) (.028) (.025) (.027)
Log(Pool) .629 .569 .971 1.060
(.080) (.093) (.077) (.083)
Cluster Pool/Total Pool —.172 .026 .706 .831
(.268) (.277) (.253) (.263)
F—statistic on Overall 26.2 16.3 23.3 26.3
Pool Effect (2,533) (2,515) (2,1L85) (2,167)
F—statistic on Industry 2.I 1.6
Effects (18,515) (18,167)
F—statistic on Technological 2.2 1.9
Area Effects (28,1L85) ()8,I85)
R2 .731 .752 .779 .792
.887 .867 .8'3
Notes: 537 observations. Numbers in parentheses under coef-
ficients are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
calculated according to White (1980); F—statistics are not
corrected for heteroskedasticity.




conventional output productivity directly. As above, the parameter 6
is the premium for the in—cluster pool.
The interpretation of the technological position and industry
effects in (5)requirescomment. Differences in technological oppor-
tunity should again cause technological area effects to be important.
In addition, there are significant variations in the "propensity to
patent" different, kinds of knowledge. This is because the value of
patent protection differs for different technologies, as does the dif-
ficulty of successful application. This has the effect of associating
differing amounts of knowledge and differing amounts of R&D with each
patent. These variations will appear as technological position
effects. A priori, we do not expect industry effects to be important
here, butallowfor them to see if the data are consistent with this view.
The knowledge production function (5) was estimated on the same
1916 cross—section of 537 firms. iFor k, we use the average patent
applications l975—1977, attempting to average out some of the noise in
the patent data. The correct way to model the patent process is to
take into account the integer nature of patents. This is done using
Poisson—type models as in Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1983). To
simplify, I ignore this complication and estimate the log—log regres-
sion This is why the zero patent observations had to be dropped.13
The columns of Table Seven are analagous to those of Table Six.
The spillover effect is significant throughout. Interestingly, its
13 .Thereare relatively few of these firms, since 10 or more patents
1969—79 were required for initial inclusion in the sample.—17—
magnitude is greater when we control for technological position and
such control also results in a within—cluster premium that is positive
and significant. The coefficients imply that the positive externality
from spillovers outweighs any negative competitive effects; a 10%
increase in the R&D of all firms would increase total patents by about
17%; 7% from the effect of their own R&D on their ownpatents,and 10%
from the collective effect of the increased pool (ignoring the feed-
back effect which the previous estimation implies would induce addi-
tional increases in R&D).
At first glance, this may seem like an implausibly large spillover
effect. I believe, however, that it is consistent with a reasonable
picture of R&D as a partial public good. In terms of marginal pro-
ducts evaluated at the mean of the data, the coefficients imply a
return of 1.7 patents per million dollars of own R&D, .05 patents per
million dollars of other firms' relevant R&D if they are outside the
firm's cluster, and .09 patents per million dollars of other firms'
relevant R&D if they are in the same cluster.
Allowing for industry effects has little effect on the pooi coef-
ficient, and the industry effects are not significant after controlling
for the other two. Thus we get the expected result on the unimpor-
tance of industries in knowledge production. The technological area
effects are marginally significant when controlling for spillovers and
industry effects.—18—
V.Total Factor Productivity
The final area investigated is the conventional overall produc-
tivity of the firm. We postulate a Cobb—Douglass production function
for the firm's output:
12 3 E ' LCt Kt (s1)exp(L 1kfk)eXP(L a,g) (6)
k £
where Lit is labor input and Kt is the stock of knowledge of the firm.
is the effective pool of the stocks of other firms' research, ana—
lagous to the pooi of their research flows above. I take logarithmic





Thus,in this formulation, the technological position effects are
interpretable as differing rates of exogenous technological progress.
In a perfect world, we would again expect no industry effects to be
important in this equation. In such a world we would be measuring
true shifts in the production function, which should not be explained
by industry assignments once we control for technological position.
In reality, however, there are three reasons to allow for industry
effects. First, to get a measure of real output we need price
deflators; these are imperfect and the errors in them have a distinct
industry pattern (Griliches and Lichtenberg, l984). Second, since—19—
input measures are not corrected for capacity utilization, changes in
this affect measured productivity. We certainly expect the growth
rate of capacity utilization to show an industry pattern. Finally,
including industry effects should mitigate the simultaneity bias that
maybepresent due to the influence of the (expected) growth rate of
demandonR&D.
Ipostulateonce again that the effective spillover pool is a
weighted sum of the in—cluster and out—of—cluster pools. It turns
out, however, that the approximation used above does not work empiri-






where A is the relative value of the out—of—cluster portion with the
in—cluster portion given weight of unity, and the • indicates the time
derivative of the entire expression in parentheses. The approximation
is now valid only ifX(SO/SC)is small. Though S° is larger than
A turns out to be essentially zero, so the approximation is valid.
There are two conceptual issues that must be addressed regarding K
in Eq. (7).First,in most work along these lines, the R&D stock is
substituted for the knowledge stock, giving R&D a role directly anala—
gous to physical investment in the production of output. Here,
however, such an approach would be inconsistent with the previous
assumption that the growth of the knowledge stock does not depend on—20--
R&D investment alone. A more consistent approach is to use the patent
stock as an indicator of accumulated knowledge. Both of these
approaches are utilized in the empirical work described below)-
The second issue relates to the interpretation of andis most
clearly stated in the context where the R&D stock is used for K. If
we were to estimate Eq. (7) as written, we would be assuming that the
output elasticity of the R&D stock is constant across firms. If firms
choose inputs optimally, this is inconsistent with the large observed
variations in R&D intensity)-5 An alternative is to assume that the
marginal product, not the elasticity, is constant (Griliches and
Lichtenberg (198}4)). That is:
3(3q/3R)(R/q)p(R/q) (9)
wherethe stock of research R has been used instead of K and the firm
subscripts have been suppressed. If we substitute (Bb) and (9) into
(7) and note that the time derivative of R is r (neglecting depreciation):l6
(q/q) =(L/)+(c/c)+p(r/q)+ (SC/SC)






14. One might also argue that the pooi variable should be based on the
output (patents) rather than the input. There are two reasons to
avoid that approach. First, the, variations in the propensity to
patent make the interpretation of patent spillovers difficult
(Jaffe (1983)). Further, patents do, after all, have something to
do with appropriation. It seems problematic to use them as a
measure of the potential leakage.
15. R&D intensity varies across firms far more than does capital or
labor intensity (Schankerman (1978)).
16. In applying this formulation to industry data, Griliches and
Lichtenberg (198I) found that a zero depreciation rate yielded a
better fit than any other.—21—
Estimating (10) instead of (7) means assuming that it is the marginal
product of R&D, not its output elasticity, that is constant across
firms, as suggested by economic theory.
In the formulation that uses the patents for the growth in
knowledge rather than R&D, it is less clear that this approach is
superior. The marginal product of patents is not likely to be equal
across industries, since their cost varies greatly, as discussed
above. The constant elasticity approach may therefore be more
reasonable a priori. In empirical work it was found that only the rate
of return form yields significant coefficients, so that form is
reported below.
The same issue, and the same ambiguity, arise with the pool
variable. Here, there is no economic force whatsoever equalizing
rates of return because this is an input over which the firm has no
control. Also, since we do not know Spence's 0, the units of the pool
variable are not really right. We choose therefore to stick with the
conventional elasticity approach for this variable.
The TFP equations were estimated using logarithmic differences,
1972—1977. The poois of other firms' R&D stocks were calculated for
each of these years. The construction of the R&D stocks is described
in Appendix A. For the R&D version, ratios of R&D to sales were
calculated as the average of the 1972 and 1977 ratios.1TFor the
patent version, average patents 1975—1977 was divided by the average
17. This eliminated 1)46 firms that did not report R&b in one of those
years.TABLE 8
RESULTS OF SALES EQUATION ESTIMATION-R&D FORM
(Differences, 1977—1972)
DependentVariable: Log(Deflated 1977 Sales) —Log(Deflated1972 Sales)
Log(Emp1oy-ment) .721 .692 .657 .661
(.0147) (.038) (.033) (.033)
ALog(Net Plant) .037 .127 .136 .152
(.o14) (.0147) (.037) (.038)
R&D/Sales 1.98 1.145 1.06 1.314
(.14i) (.1.6) (.30)
Log(Cluster Pool Stock) .0141 .098 .089 .099
(.0149) (.051) (.039) (.O14ii
Out of Cluster Pool Stock)
.000314 .00035 .000214 .00035 Cluster Pool Stock
(.00029) (.00028) (.000214) (.00022)
F—statistic on Overall .3 1.9 1.2 2.6
Pool Effect (2,1421) (2,1403) (2,373) (2,355)
F—statistic on Industry- 6.3 l.1i.
Effects (18,1403) (18,355)
F—statistic on Technological 3.0 1.1
Area Effects (148,373) (148,355)
R2 .618 .702 .723 .7142
.191 .172 .172 .171
Notes: 14314 observations. Numbers in parentheses under coef-
ficients are heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors
calculated according to white (1980); F—statistics are not
corrected for heteroskedasticity.




of deflated 1972 sales and deflated 1977sales.
Table 8 presents the result of the R&D version. Again the
columns are arranged in the same pattern. With no industry or tech-
nological area effects (Column 1), the pool effect is insignificant.
Adding industry effects improves things greatly. The physical capital
coefficient becomes more reasonable, and the pool coefficient becomes
significant; the industry effects themselves are also significant.
Adding the technological position variables has a similar effect on
the other coefficients, and the technological effects are significant
when added alone. When all three effects are allowed, the pool
variable is marginally significant, but neither industry nor tech-
nological effects are significant after allowing for the other and the
pool effect. The parameter A is essentially zero throughout, indi-
cating that only the within—cluster pool has a discernible affect on
TFP growth.
The estimated R&D coefficient of about 1.3 (over 5 years) implies
that each dollar of R&D yields an annual sales increase of about 25
cents. The interpretation of this figure is clouded because R&D
employees and machines are also included in L and C. The R&D
coefficient may be roughly a measure of the excess return to R&D (See
Schankerman (1981)). Since, however, we are not controlling for
materials, this 25 cents is not pure profit. If materials are roughly
half of sales, this implies an excess return to own R&D in the neigh-
borhood of 10—15%. Another way to evaluate the own R&D effect is to
look at the implied elasticity of sales with respect to R&D, which, by
(9), is pK(R/q.). Using the estimate of 1.34 from column ,weget—23--
1.311/5=.268 for PKinannual terms. Evaluating R/q at the sample
means, this yields an estimate of the elasticity of .030.
The pooi coefficient is directly an elasticity. It says that when
all your neighbors increase their R&D by 10%, you can produce 1% more
output with the same amount of capital and labor.
Table 9 presents the results for the sales equation using patents
rather than R&D as the measure of new kno1edge. Because patents
measure new knowledge production only with a large amount of error,
OLS estimates in this case would be severely biased. Therefore, we
utilize 2SLS with the R&D to sales ratio and pool (flow) to sales
ratio as instruments. The results are broadly similar to the R&D
form. Here, the pool effect is significant throughout; again neither
technological position nor industries is significant after controlling
for the other.l8
The patent/sales coefficient shows a slightly different pattern
than the R&D coefficient. The latter fell when we controlled for
technological position effects, a pattern consistent with the tech-
nological opportunity story, if R&D and productivity growth are both
high where opportunity is high. The patent coefficient, however,
increases when we add technological area effects. It is not clear
what interpretation to give to this.
18. The instrumental variable method renders the usual F—test invalid,
since the restricted and unrestricted sum of squares are no longer
independent. We must resort to an asymptotic chi—square test,
called the test of over—identifying restrictions by Hausman (198k).TABLE 9
RESULTSOF SALES EQUATION ESTIMATION—-PATENT FORM
(2sLs estimatesusing r/q andPool/qas instruments for Patents/sales)
(Differences, 1977 —1972)
DependentVariable: Log(Deflated 1977 Sales) —Log(Deflated1972 Sales)
1
Log(Employment) •7119 .703 .662 .670
(.052) (.0142) (.0311) (.0311.)
Log(Net Plant) .0314 .133 .131 .11411
(.011.7) (.0149) (.038) (.038)
Patents/Sales .5011 .357 .783 1.01
(.309) (.326) (.355) (.11.10)
Log(Cluster Pool Stock) .065 .093 .088 .101
(.052) (.051) (.068) (.011.5)
(Out of Cluster Pool Stock)
.00050 .000140 .00027 .000141
Cluster Pool Stock
(.00031) (.00030) (.00026) (.000211)
X2—statistic for Overall 2.8 14.8 3.8 5.14
Pool Effect
X8—statistic on Industry 814.0 25.2
Effects
X8—statistic on Technological 120.5 55.2
Area Effects
Second Stage Statistics: R2 .595 .692 .709 .719
.197 .176 .179 .181
Notes: 14314 observations. Numbers in parentheses under coef-
ficients are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
calculated according to White (1982); x —statistics are not
corrected for heteroskedasticity.




Ifwe takethepatent coefficient from Column 4,weget an esti.—
mate of the marginal product of a patent of about 1.0 million dollars
over 5 years, or about $200,000 in terms of the annual sales increase.
Bythesame argument asabove,this implies a return to patenting over
andabove the normal return to the R&D that produced it on the order
of $100,000 per year per patent granted.19 The patent elasticity eva-
luated at the sample mean for K/qisabout .039.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to address an old question——marketpull
versustechnology push ——anda newer question ——theimportance of
spillovers——bythinking about the location of firms in technology and
market space. I find that, when allowing for all 3 effects, both
technological position and industry are significant in explaining R&D
intensity; the technological effects are significant in explaining
patent productivity, and we cannot distinguish between the two in
explaining TFP growth (at 1% significance). In interpreting these
statistical statements, it is important to remember that different
degrees of freedom are involved in each case. For perspective, Table
Ten shows the simple analysis of variance for these and the spillover
effects. Note, for example, that the technological effects actually
explain considerably more of the TFPresidualthan do the market
effects. Overall the pattern of effects is roughly what we would
19. The zero depreciation assumption implicit in this formulation may
bemore problematic for patents than for R&D.TABLE 10
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
SPILLOVER, TECHNOLOGICAL POSITION AND INDUSTRY EFFECTS
Equation Percent of Variance Explained By-:
Spillovers Technological Industry Overall R2
Position
R&D Intensity1
When added first 12.0 15.2 115.1 .561
When added last .5 8.7 10.6
Patent Productivity2
When added first 12.9 19.7 11.6 .328
When added last 9.7 13.3
Growth of TFP3
When added first .2 30.1 211.5 .350
When added last .2 10.1 4.8
Notes: 1. log(R&D) minus log(sales) and log(netplant)
each multiplied by- their respective coef-.
ficients from Table 6 Column 1
2. log(patents) minus log of R&D times its coef-
ficient from Table 7 Column 1L
3.growth rate of sales minus the growth rate of
employment, the growth rate of net plant and
the R&D/Sales ratio, each multiplied by their
respective coefficients from Table 8 Column l—25—
expect on the basis of theory,withthe qualifications discussed above
regarding price indices and capacity utilization in the TFP equation.
Both technolor and industry are important in explaining R&D intensity
and measured TFP growth; in patent productivity the technological
effects predominate.
If we were to view the patent equation in isolation, there is no
way to distinguish whether the technological position effects repre-
sent differences in opportunity or in the propensity to patent. If,
however, it were only the latter, we would not expect the effect to
carry over to the other equations.
One question raised by the degrees of freedom issue is the sen-
sitivity of the results to the fineness of classification used in
constructing the patent and sales distribution vectors. Exhaustive
sensitivity analysis on this point would be quite expensive, but I did
make a few experimental attempts to find a 20 category patent break-
down and a 50 category SIC grouping. I found that using the former
reduced the fit quite a bit, while using the latter improved the fit
very little over the results reported herein.
I find evidence of the effects of spillovers in several aspects
of the innovation process, with the positive externalities apparently
outweighing any negative competitive effects. When R&D in a firm's
vicinity increases, the firm does more R&D itself, it produces more
patents per R&D dollar, and its productivity grows faster, even
controlling for the increased R&D and patents. These effects are pre—
sent controlling for both industry and technological position effects
as measured by sales and patent distributions.—26--
It is interesting, and perhaps surprising, that these spillover
effects "travel" quite far in technology space. In both the R&D and
patent equations, a significant portion of the spillover effect is
generated by firms outside the receiving firm's cluster. Only in the
TFP growth equation is the spillover effect apparently localized. It
is not clear whether this difference is substantive or an artifact of
the pooi variable, construction. For the TFP equation, it is the ratio
of the 1977 to 1972 pooi of R&D stocks that is relevant. For this
variable, the variance of the total pool is only 6.5% of the within
cluster pool. By contrast, for the pool of annual flows the variance
of the total is twice that of the within—cluster portion. Thus it may
simply be that the overall pool changes too slowly to discern its
impact in this type of regression.
The strongest spillover effect was found in the patent equation.
As noted above, the estimates imply that the majority of the patents
produced by a general increase in R&D come from the spillover effect.
There is one possible problem with interpretation in this equation
that should be noted. Patents are an indicator of innovation, but
they are also a tool of appropriation. It could be that when others
do more R&D, the firm worries more about protecting its own results
and hence takes out more patents without necessarily producing more
innovation. While there is probably something to this explanation, it
seems unlikely that it is the dominant effect. If it were, I would
expect the within—cluster premium to be much greater. As it is, the
out—of—cluster portion is typically contributing 2/3 or more of the—27'—
total effective pooi. These "long distance" spillovers are likely to
be in the nature of basic research results, rather than very specific
developments. Such research would not seem likely to induce an
increasing propensity to patent.
There are three logical next steps that will be explored in sub-
sequent research. The technological relationships embodied in the TFP
and patent equations will be combined with assumptions about com-
petitive behavior to yield an R&D demand equation incorporating
spillovers. This should permit estimation of the three equations as a
consistent system. In addition, this paper did not utilize fully the
panel nature of the available data. Both the Compustat data and the
patent class data are available over time. This may permit a fuller
exploration of the spillover effects.
Finally, we have assumed herein that the conditions of appropri—
ability do not depend on industry or technological area. This is
surely wrong. To get a really useful picture of the spillover pheno-
menon, it will be necessary to allow for variations in the appropri—
ability environment. This is not, however, simply a matter of
allowing the coefficients to vary across the sample. Rather, varia-
tions in the appropriability environment have to be incorporated in
the construction of the pooi variable, since what is relevant is the
environment of the spilling firm, not the receiving firm.
With multiple caveats on the interpretation of the present
results, it is still interesting to dramatize their implications for
the importance of the spillover phenomenon. As a thought experiment,
imagine generating somehow an exogenous increase of 10% in the R&D of—28—
all manufacturing firms. Ignoring the feedback to even greater R&D
implied by the R&D intensity equation, the estimates herein predict a
17% increase in patents as a result. This, in turn, would lead to a
1.8% increase in output with given capital and labor, partially from
the direct effect and partly from the spillovers. Without spillovers
at either stage we would have predicted oniy a 7% increase in patents
and only a .3% increase in output.—29—
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
I. INDUSTRY DEFINITIONS SIC
1 FOOD & KINDRED PRODUCTS 20
2 TEXTILES & APPAREL 22,23
3 CHEM EXC. DRUGS 28 exc. 283,281414
14 DRUGS & MEDII'TSTRS. 283,281414,3814
5 PETROLEUM REF. & EX. 29
6 RUBBER & MISC PLASTICS 30
7 STONE,CLAY & GLASS 32
8 PRIMARYMETALS 33
9 FABRIC •METALPRODUCTS 314, exc3148
10 ENGS, FARM & CONST. EQ. 351,352,353
11 OFFICE, COMP., & ACCTG 357
12 0TH MACH,NOT EC 35,NEC
13 ELEC EQ. & SUPPLIES 365,366,367
lb COMMUNICATION EQ. 36,NEC
15 MOTOR VEil & TRANS EQ 37 ,NEC
16 AIRCRAFT & AEROSPACE 372,376
17PROF. & SCI EQ. 38,NEC
18 LUMBER, WOOD & PAPER 214,26,27
19 MISC MANU NEC 3148,21,25,31,39,NEC
II.OTHERVARIABLES
Sales:Deflated sales was calculated from Compustat sales figures
using firm—specific price deflators, constructed as weighted
averages of price series at the 14—digit SIC level. These
price deflators are from the Bureau of Industrial Engineering
of the U.S. Commerce Department. The firm weights are based
on 1978 Compustat Business Segment Data. For more detail,
see Addanki, et al (1983)
R&D: Taken from Compustat, with some addition of data from 10K
reports where Compustat data was missing. See Cummins, et al (1982)
Net
Plant:An estimate of the inflation—adjusted depreciated capital
stock of the firm. It is based on the book value of net
plant times the ratio of an investment deflator for the year
to the investment deflator n years ago, where n is an esti-
mate of the average age of the firm's capital. For details,
see Cummins, et al (1982)
R&D
Stocks: The R&D stocks used to construct the pooi of stocks were
calculated from R&D flows assuming 15%/year depreciation, and
using as a starting value the first reported flow value
divided by .22 (15% depreciation plus an assumed 7% annual
growth in the flow since to). See Addanki, et al (1983)
Market
Share:The PICA database gives market shares for each b—digit SIC in
which a firm has sales. To form the firm average, these were
weighted by the fraction of the firm's sales going to the SIC.—32—
APPENDIX B:
DESCRIPTION OF THE CLUSTERING PROCEDURE
Clustering is a generic term for a variety of techniques for
grouping observations on multivariate data. The objective is to
arrange the data in groups so that, in some sense, the observations
are similar to other observations in the same group and dissimilar to
all others. The easiest way to think of this is to visualize the
observations in multi—dimensional space, and imagine grouping them so
that the distances from the group means are minimized.
For many observations and even a few potential groups, the number
of possible clusterings is a big number——not big like the federal
budget deficit, but big like the number of atoms in the solar system.
This fact, plus the fact that the objective function is grossly non—
concave with respect to rearrangements, means that no clustering pro-
cedure exists that is guaranteed to find the best clustering for any
real data. All procedures are somewhat ad hoc, results are sensitive
to initial conditions, and no meaningful statistical tests of the
resulting clustering can be performed. Clustering is a data descrip-
tion or simplification tool, not an analytic one. Its usefulness
rests on facilitating subsequent analysis.
In the present application the goal is to identify groups of firms
doing research in similar areas. The data to be used for this purpose
is the distribution of the firms9 patents over classes. The key attri-
bute of these data is that they can be viewed as being generated by some—33—
(unknown) underlying niultinomial distribution: for each patent granted,
the firm takes a draw from this distribution to determine what class the
patent will be in. This particular structure of the data makes it
possible to construct a clustering procedure with an explicit probabi-
listic basis. The clustering problem is the identification of groups
of firms whose patents are generated by the same distribution; firms in
different clusters draw their patents from different distributions.
These underlying distributions must be estimated as we do the
clustering, giving the procedure a bootstrap flavor.
The procedure utilized here is derived from something called the
k—means algorithm in the clustering literature (Hartigan (1975),
McQueen (1967)). In the k—means algorithm, observations are somehow
grouped into k initial groups; the k means of these groups are calcu-
lated, and firms are then reassigned to the group such that the
Euclidean distance to the group mean is minimized. Here, the multino-.
mial nature of the data is exploited to derive an assignment criterion
other than Euclidean distance. Instead of calculating group means, we
calculate the fraction of all patents granted to firms in that cluster
that occurred in each category:
jk( 'ik1 'ik (Al)
icj icj k
where j indexes clusters, i indexes firms, and k indexes categories.
jk is the probability of a patent issued to a firm in cluster,j being
in category k; nik is the number of patents issued to firm i in
category k. On the provisional assumption that all firms in cluster j—34—
derive their patents from the same multinomial distribution, these
fractionsare the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of
the distribution.
We now consider reassigning the firms to other clusters.For each
firm/cluster combination, we calculate the probability of the firm's
observed distribution having come from the estimated inultinomial para-
meter vector for the cluster. This probability is:
pij=[ni.!/ nik!Jffjkik
(A2)
where n. is firm l's total patents. For the next iteration, the firm
is assigned to the cluster where this probability is greatest.
Fortunately, this can be simplified by noting that the term in
brackets does not depena on j, and hence is irrelevant to the maximi-
zation and can be ignored. Also, maximizing log(pjj) is the same as





When this is finished, we recalculate the vectors Jrj using the new
assignments; then we begin again. The process is continued until no
reassignments occur •20
Using this procedure, it is natural to develop a measure of good—
ness of fit based on the log likelihood of the data conditional on the
20. Fq. (A3) is not defined for lTjkO.Inpractice,, if is zero and
ik is not, we set Pij to zero, preventing assignment of i to
cluster i. If is zero and 51k is also, we set nlog(nj) to zero.—35—
finalclustering. The actual log likelihood is a mess, because it
includes the bracketed term in Eq. (A2). We can, however, calculate a
likelihood ratio in which these terms all cancel out. If we define
as the fraction of all firms' patents taken in category k, we can
calculate the log probability that each firm's patents come from that
grand multiriomial distribution. If we sum these over all firms, and
subtract this from the sum of log probabilities conditional on the
clustering, the bracketed terms drop out, leaving:
LR=fl n. log(ir )— n.log(ir ) (1)
1k ik jkik ik k
This "statistic" measures the improvement in the likelihood gained by
considering the firms' patents as coming from the cluster multinomial
distributions rather than one grand distribution. The word statistic
is in quotes because it has no known distribution, and probably no
knowable distribution. It is only a qualitative and comparative
measure of the fit.
This multinomial clustering procedure has several problems.
First, it is not guaranteed to converge. Since the firms are con-
sidered for reassignment one at a time, it is quite possible for a
firm to be assigned to a cluster that is in fact worse than its
current one, once all reassignments are taken into account. The process
can wander about, repeatedly moving firms back and forth. This beha-
vior was observed and will be discussed below. It is not even assured
that the likelihood function will improve at each iteration, although
behavior where this was not the case was not observed. Even when the—36—
proceduredoes converge, there is no guarantee that it is to a global
maximum. In practice, one can only try various initial conditions and
pick the best fit found.
Finally, this procedure does not determine the number of clusters
to be identified. One can only try various numbers; of course, the
fit should always improve when the number is increased. It maybe
possible to calculate something like an adjustedR2 that would measure
the quality of the fit, controlling for the number of clusters. This
has not been done. In this application, it was found that the con—
vergence properties of the procedure deteriorated quite suddenly if
the number of clusters was made too small, so the smallest number that
worked reasonably well was used.
The initial conditions for the clustering are specified by a set
of unique hypothetical multinomial distributions, as many distribu-
tions as clusters desired; the iterative process is begun by assigning
firms to these vectors using the likelihood criterion. Two general
methods of obtaining these starting distributions were used. One
method was to use the actual distributions over particular groupings
of the data itself, as in the McQueen k—means algorithm. The other
method was to specify arbitrarily distributions designed to be "far
apart" in technolor space and yet expected to attract significant
numbers of firms. The results from several attempts are summarized in
Appendix Table One. The approach which seemed to work the best was to
choose a subset of the patent categories themselves, specifically
those that had many firms having that category as the firm's primary—37—
one. For this subset of categories, vectors were formed with .95 as
the probability for the category- and .001 as the probability for all
others.21 This set of pseudo—unit vectors was used as the starting
seeds. Thus, on the first iteration, each firm is assigned to the
cluster corresponding to its primary category, if its primary category-
is one of the targets; if not, it Is assigned to its second, third,
fourth, or whatever is necessary. Then, the actual distribution vec-
tors of these clusters are calculated, and away we go.
The question of the number of clusters was settled when the
program refused to converge if asked to find less than about 20
clusters. The final run, which was used in the regressions described
in the body of the paper, to be used below, resulted in 21 clusters,
which are summarized in Table 3. The name of the cluster is the
name of the patent category that served as the initial cluster seed.
This clustering was arrived at by starting with 23 targets, and then
dropping two clusters that were small and close to others. Having
done this, the program was also run starting at the beginning with
the corresponding 21 pseudo—unit vectors, and a very similar
clustering resulted.
Although it is obviously difficult to tell, the final clustering
seems to be doing what we want it to do: distinguishing firms' tech-
nological focus. For example, Adhesives and Coatings picks up a mix—
21. Zeros are avoided because no firm can be assigned to a cluster
that has a zero probability in any category for which the firm has
even a single patent. (See note 20 above.)—38—
ture of textile and paper companies. A few oil companies get nved in
with the chemical companies. Xerox, an "office equipment" company- by
SIC, is at the center of the Chemistry-, Electrochemistry cluster,
along with Kodak and Polaroid. Interestingly, the big auto companies
end up in Power plants (i.e. engines), leaving the equipment makers
like John Deere and International Harvester in the Vehicles c1uter.22
A known problem with clustering techniques in general is that they
are capable of finding clusters where none exist. To get some indica-
tion of whether these data are "truly" clustered, a simulation experi-
ment was conducted. Fake patent vectors for each firm were generated,
using the firm's true total patents, but distributing them over classes
randomly based on draws from the grand multinomial distribution of all
the data. That is, observations were generated that truly- belonged in
one cluster. The clustering program was run on this data, using as
starting seeds those used in the 21 cluster final run. After 10
iterations, the procedure was still reassigning over 100 firms at each
iteration. The likelihood ratio was about 6000 (compared to 81000 in
the chosen clustering) and was not improving,23 providing some evidence
that, when the procedure convergences in a well—behaved manner, some
true clustering of the data does exist.
22. A complete listing of the firms by cluster is available from the
author.
23. The fact that this clustering yielded a LR of 6000 is an indication
of why the usual chi—square tests do not apply.APPENDIX TABLE ONE
CLUSTERING RESULTS FROM SEVERAL RUNS
Run No.of No. of Total ConvergenceLikelihood
Clusters Iterations Reassign— Achieved? Ratio
ments
1 23 8 201 Yes 80113
2 23 7 193 Yes 81628
3 20 10 i81 Yes 70206
11. 23 8 297 Yes 51832
5 21 10 231 Yes 80136
6 5 10 283 No 50839
7 20 15 270 No 77107
Starting Values:'
1. Pseudo unit vectors based on classes with most patents.
2. Pseudo unit vectors based on most primary class firms.
3. Industry category fractions.
4•Randomgroup category fractions.
5—7.Sameas 2